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Abstract
A central debate in defining emotional space is whether emotions are organized
categorically (e.g., fear, happy, disgust) or continuously (i.e., along the independent
dimensions of valence and arousal). Emotional facial expressions are one tool often
leveraged in trying to define emotional space. Faces are rich sources of social and
emotional information. Faces, like emotions, can be organized in either categorical (e.g.,
happy, sad) or continuous (e.g., open-closed) ways. Therefore, understanding the
relatedness of emotional facial expressions to each other may shed light on the
underlying structure of emotions. Binocular rivalry (BR) is a tool which can be leveraged
to measure the relatedness of two percepts. When each eye is presented with a different
image, the visual system is forced to resolve the images into a coherent percept by either
selecting one percept to dominate or blending the two images. BR was employed across
three experiments with emotional expressions (happy, fear, disgust, sadness, and neutral)
to quantify similarities and differences in how the visual system responds to emotional
faces. In Study 1, emotional faces dominated over neutral faces. In Study 2, emotionemotion conflict was explored, and results suggest a positivity bias in emotion
perception, as happy faces dominated over all negative faces. In addition, fear dominated
over disgust and sad faces. In Study 3, the role of top-down, directed attention on
perception was tested by asking participants to direct their attention to the presence or
absence of positivity or negativity. Results suggest that the positivity bias observed in
ii

Study 2 is enhanced by directed attention towards positivity. Overall, these studies
demonstrate that emotion expression information is processed preferentially compared to
neutral expressions, that emotion-emotion conflict can be characterized by both positivity
and fear biases, and that top-down attention can modulate these biases. Results from
these studies were not consistent with any continuous models that were tested. Therefore,
results can be interpreted as supporting a categorical emotion model in which happy and
fear are prioritized compared to other emotions.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Defining emotion, and what constitutes an emotion, has been a persistent
challenge in affective psychology (Mulligan, & Scherer, 2012) since William James first
published “What is an Emotion?” in 1884. Among the most commonly posited and
questioned assumptions about emotions are that they are 1) innate, 2) discrete (as
opposed to continuous), 3) under volitional control and 4) that negative emotions are
preferentially processed compared to positive ones (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Emotional
faces have been used to probe the nature of emotion and were used here in combination
with binocular rivalry (BR) to show that a) emotional stimuli are preferentially processed
compared to neutral stimuli, b) positive emotions dominate over negative ones, c) fear
dominates over other negative emotions and d) that these processing biases can be
modulated by volitional control in the context of BR. These findings contribute to our
understanding of how emotions are structured and lend support to a categorical account
of emotions.
The way that conflict is induced and resolved is one tool to investigate the nature
and structure of emotions. Conflict can be defined as the competition between
incongruent signals and frequently occurs in the presence of multiple sources of
emotional information. Quantifying varying degrees of conflict elicited by emotional
stimulus pairs can help inform models of emotions. BR offers a unique paradigm in
1

which to investigate aspects of conflict which can help resolve questions about perceptual
similarity of emotional expressions. Additionally, this paradigm allows for manipulation
of both bottom-up and top-down influences to ascertain the degree to which each
contribute to emotional processing.
Structure of emotion
Theoretical models. Although not the express purpose of theoreticians, theoretical
models of emotion often implicitly or explicitly make predictions about the role of
conflict that is present between emotions. The two primary models for describing the
structure of emotion are categorical (discrete) emotion theory and continuous
(circumplex) models of emotion. These models organize emotions by different criteria
and therefore have differing predictions about sources of conflict and similarity in
emotions.
Continuous models of emotion. Continuous models of emotion emphasize
dimensional similarity between emotions. Many continuous theories are based on
circumplex models which contain multiple dimensions, anchored by dichotomous pairs.
Circumplex models propose N-dimensional spaces in which emotions exist between
typically two or three dichotomies such as arousal (high or low), valence (positive or
negative) or behavioral tendency (approach or avoid). Most of these models assume that
emotions can be vague and overlapping, including shared physiological signals (Russell
& Barrett, 1999). The most heavily studied circumplex model maps emotions along the
independent dimensions of arousal and valence (e.g., Russell, 1980). Such models have
been heavily supported empirically (see Barrett & Russell, 1999; Posner, Russell, &
Peterson, 2005). In these models, emotions which differ along the proposed dimensions,
2

such as opposites, should be the least similar and display the most conflict. Overall, the
basic circumplex model of emotion predicts the highest level of conflict for cross-valence
pairs (i.e., happiness and sadness), while within-valence pairs should be more similar,
especially if both emotions are similar on another dimension, such as on arousal (i.e., fear
and disgust would share qualities of high arousal and negative valence).
Basic emotion theory. Basic emotion theory posits that specific emotions (e.g., fear,
disgust) serve evolutionarily adaptive responses that prime behavior and carry unique
psychophysiological signatures (Ekman, 1992). This prominent concept arose as early as
Darwin (1872/1965; reviewed in Barrett, 2011) and assumes that emotions are: universal
(e.g., shared across cultures and species); have distinct expressions (e.g., facial and
physiological responses); generate automatic appraisals; and require response coherence
(e.g., synchronized response across systems; Ekman, 1992). Considerable support for
basic emotion theory comes from categorical classification paradigms, such as labeling
emotional facial expressions (e.g., Ekman, 1993; Russell, 1994). Indeed, cross-cultural
similarities in emotion facial generation and categorization was central to the concept of
‘universal’ emotions and suggests that such categorization processes may be, at least in
part, inherent (i.e., have a genetic basis; Ekman, 1993). Theoretically, the function of
emotions in motivation and behavior may best be conceptualized with discrete groupings,
such as approach or avoidance behaviors, which depend on synchronized responding
across levels (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Elliot & Thrash, 2002; Scherer, 2001).
Restated, a coherent behavioral response (e.g., fleeing a predator) requires multiple
systems act in a coordinated way, across multiple levels of processing (e.g., behavioral,
psychophysiology). In basic emotion theory, conflict can arise within same-valence pairs
3

as well as cross-valence pairs, as discrete emotions are not always assumed to lie along
similarity dimensions (e.g., valence). However, discrete emotions can be imposed on
continuous dimensional spaces, incorporating aspects of basic emotion theory, and
discrete categorization may be adaptive at certain levels of processing (Toscano,
McMurray, Dennhardt, & Luck, 2010). For example, perceptual information may be
encoded continuously but perceived categorically.
Functional emotional expressions. Face processing in general has been described as
one of the most highly developed visual skills in humans and relies on a distributed
neural network (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000). Facial expressions can serve as
important sources of emotional information (Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, &
Gabrieli, 2003; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman 1993; Susskind et al., 2008). Evidence
suggests that specific neural regions may be specialized for evaluating emotional faces
belonging to discrete emotion categories (Anderson et al., 2003). For instance, the
amygdala has been shown to be critical for the evaluation of fear (Adolphs, Tranel,
Damasio, & Damasio, 1994; Whalen et al., 1998) and the anterior insula is specialized for
disgust evaluation (Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun, & Young, 2000; Phillips et al., 1997;
Phillips et al., 1998). Susskind and colleagues showed that machine learning classifiers
trained on discrete emotional expressions alone were able to produce similarity
judgments consistent with human raters using six discrete emotions. This suggests that
similarity in expression meaning is supported by superficial similarities in expression
appearance (Susskind, Littlewort, Bartlett, Movellan, & Anderson, 2007). In other words,
training on discrete facial emotions allowed for a continuous model of emotion to be
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computed suggesting that both models of emotion may co-exist and highlighting the
importance of facial expressions in understanding emotional space.
This functional view of emotional expressions (FEE) model, which can be
considered an alternative continuous emotion theory, predicts both cross- and withinvalence conflict. Happiness and sadness, as in the valence-arousal circumplex model,
were categorized as least similar and therefore most likely to induce conflict, consistent
with the valence distinction predicted by all models of emotion discussed so far.
Critically, fear and disgust are within-negative oppositional pairs, as fear serves the
purpose of expanding sensory input, while disgust works to minimize it (Lee &
Anderson, 2017; Susskind, Lee, Cusi, Feiman, Grabski, & Anderson, 2008). This
opposition is not predicted by the valence-arousal circumplex model of emotion, as
disgust and fear share valence, arousal and avoidance tendencies. If the processing of
emotional expressions is influenced by the same similarity dimensions (e.g., valence,
sensory functions), then it should be possible to predict differential patterns of conflict
between more and less similar pairs of emotions. If conflict follows with the surface
similarity as measured by Susskind et al., (2007) happiness and sadness as well as fear
and disgust should show the greatest amount of conflict as they are dimensional
opposites. If, however, the more basic valence-arousal based circumplex model of
emotion is correct, fear and disgust should not exhibit large amounts of conflict.
Methodological concerns
Several separate literatures have measured conflict in the presence of different
emotional stimuli. However, the majority of these studies are interested in documenting
the conflict induced by the presence of emotional (rather than neutral) information, which
5

distracts from the task at hand. Rarely are emotions pitted against one another in these
paradigms, and when they are, typically the emotions vary in valence, so the conflict
elicited by within-valence emotion pairs is vastly understudied. In addition, the use of
static, single responses and forced-choice options in emotional research (e.g., labelling or
categorization tasks, single bipolar ratings of affect, dot-probe) is pervasive and may be
of concern when trying to measure conflict (see Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999;
Russell & Carroll, 1999). Research using single categorical outcomes are unable to
capture conflict as such paradigms only reveal the dominant, or the strongest, response
(Russell, 1994). For example, labeling a face as angry reveals the strongest association
but cannot inform whether other emotions (e.g., fear, happy) produced conflicting
associations. Even in the case of mis-categorization (e.g., labeling an angry face as
fearful), the outcome only reflects the strongest association. Although it may seem
reasonable to infer that such mis-categorization suggests a functional association between
two emotions (e.g., fear is more related to anger than happy if more often confused with
anger than happy), these designs have difficulty quantifying the relatedness of emotional
expressions and to what extent they may conflict.
Binocular rivalry
Binocular rivalry (BR) is a well-validated method for examining competing signals
and has offered insight into how emotion and perception interact. BR paradigms present
different images to each eye, resulting in spontaneous switching between the two
percepts, although integration or mixing of the percepts can occur (Blake, 1989; Blake,
2001; Blake & Logothetis, 2002). Integration is more likely to occur when stimuli are
congruent, or more similar, and dominance (gaining subjective awareness) relies on
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bolstering of the attended-to signal, rather than suppression of competing signal (Hohwy,
Roepstorff, & Friston, 2008). That is, both percepts are encoded at lower levels of visual
processing, but the signal from the dominant percept gets additional processing to
achieve subjective awareness. BR allows the examination of perceptual switching while
maintaining consistent retinal stimulation.
BR paradigms produce several dependent measures, including initial predominance,
dominance duration, mixed predominance, mixed dominance, response latency and
number of oscillations, which allow for dynamic measurement of the competitive
process. Initial predominance refers to the image that gains subjective awareness first and
may be a proxy for initial attentional biases (e.g., towards threat; Singer, Eapen, Grillon,
Ungerleider, and Hendler, 2012). Dominance duration refers to the proportion of time a
percept is perceived, and may reflect greater overall processing or strength regardless of
initial preference. Additionally, integration (mixing) of the two images is possible and
increases with percept similarity, possibly reflecting another distinct method of resolving
conflict. Mixed predominance refers to the proportion of initial percepts that were mixed
and mixed duration refers to the total amount of time that mixed percepts were perceived.
Number of oscillations refers to the total switches between the two percepts. More rapid
oscillation may potentially index increased competition between the two percepts.
Therefore, BR paradigms allow for dynamic modeling of several key components of
perception, subjective awareness and conflict.
BR models have offered considerable insight into visual awareness and suggest
dissociable neural regions are associated with subjective perception and retinal
stimulation. Tong and colleagues used a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
7

BR task to examine conflict between faces and houses and found activation in higherlevel visual processing areas, the fusiform face area (FFA) and parahippocampal place
area (PPA), reflected perceptual switching even though retinal stimulation remained
constant (Tong, Nakayama, Vaughan, & Kanwisher, 1998). That is, greater activity of
these regions was more associated with the dominant percept, suggesting some forms of
conflict are already resolved by this level. The primary visual pathway begins with lowerlevel encoding (e.g., spatial frequency) in V1 and V2 and proceeds to higher level feature
encoding in V3, V4 (e.g., texture), and V5 (e.g., motion). More specialized processing
happens in a distributed network such as face representation in the superior temporal
sulcus (FFA/STS) and determining parts of a whole in the infero-temporal area (IT;
reviewed in Orban, 2008). There remains debate over whether competition occurs
between low-level (V1) monocular representations or later visual processing reflecting
incompatible pattern matching. Current models favor the idea of competition at multiple
levels with reciprocal feedback (Tong, Meng, & Blake, 2006). There is also evidence to
suggest that some types of pattern coding may be more dependent on awareness than
others (Sweeny, Grabowecky, & Suzuki, 2011). Taken together, the mechanisms and
network models supporting BR may offer insight into the ways in which the brain
hierarchically encodes and resolves competing signals to ameliorate perceptual conflict.
Stochastic resonance and binocular rivalry
Stochastic resonance (SR) is a phenomenon found in many natural and man-made
systems including particle physics, machine learning and basic physiology (Moss, Ward,
& Sannita, 2004; Wiesenfeld & Moss, 1995). SR models have been proposed to explain
neurodynamics on both the perceptual level and as a mechanism for modeling competing
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and nested input systems (Braun & Mattia, 2010; Hänggi, 2002; Aihara, Kitajo, Nozaki,
& Yamamoto, 2010). Stochastic resonance systems have at minimum three basic
components: a weak coherent input (signal), a threshold allowing a non-linear response
(discrete outcome), and at least one source of noise (Gammaitoni, Hanggi, Jung, &
Marchesoni, 1998). Noise in the same frequency as the signal will function additively,
bolstering the signal, while noise not aligned will dampen the signal by decreasing the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Bolstering of the signal can result in threshold events,
achieving non-linear effects (e.g., discrete change) and has been proposed to play a role
in many perceptive processes (e.g., increase SNR to reach a categorical decision;
Wiesenfeld & Moss, 1995). One of the first studies to suggest an evolutionary based SR
system demonstrated that paddlefish have electroreceptive fields to detect prey (signal)
which are optimized by the water (external) noise levels generated by their prey (Russell,
Wilkens, & Moss, 1999). In this model, the weak input from the prey is coupled with
noise from the environment to optimize prey detection. However internally generated
noise can also modulate signal. For example, selective attention may influence internal
noise resulting in bolstered attended signals and diminished suppressed signals.
Bistable SR systems are common and offer considerable explanatory power in terms
of handling and resolving competing or incongruent signals (see Braun & Mattia, 2010).
Briefly, two or more signals, which can be in conflict (e.g., alternative ways of
interpreting an image), are resolved through threshold events (transitions between stablestates) on the subjective awareness level while both maintain a sub-threshold signal. BR
offers an example of bistable SR as it alternates between two competing percepts.
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BR has been characterized as a bistable SR system where perception switches
between the two percepts based on signal strength (e.g., contrast, emotionality) but with
both inputs still being encoded (Kim, Grabowecky, & Suzuki, 2006). Miller and Katz
(2010) found evidence for such noise-induced changes between discrete neural states
when deciding on the palatableness of stimuli reflected in behavioral responses (e.g., spit
or swallow). Additionally, SR systems have found support in neural models of decisionmaking and may be optimal given the inherent noise in both our environments and
perception (Duan, Chapeau-Blodeau, & Abbott, 2014; Longtin, 1993; Miller & Katz,
2013). SR systems, especially bistable systems, may offer unique insight into general
affective processing and can be understood through BR.
Bistable systems have been framed as a double-well potential, in which dynamic
oscillations between the two stable states (i.e., percepts) in the system depend on the
strength of the competing signals (e.g., contrast intensity, affective-content) and the
current dominant (perceived percept) period cannot be predicated based on prior
dynamics (Kim, et al., 2006; Richards, Wilson, & Sommer, 1994). This perceptual
switching between relative stable states (threshold events) has been characterized as a
bistable SR system and may be extended to affective processes. Here the input signals are
the two face stimuli, coupled with internal noise, resulting in threshold perception
switching between the alternative interpretations.
The laws of binocular rivalry
Four laws to explain the dynamics of binocular rivalry were proposed by Levelt
(1965) and revised by Brascamp, Klink, & Levelt (2015). The revised laws according to
Brascamp et al., (2015) state:
10

I. Increasing stimulus strength for one eye will increase the perceptual dominance
of that eye’s stimulus.
II. Increasing the difference in stimulus strength between the two eyes will
primarily act to increase the average perceptual dominance duration of the
stronger stimulus.
III. Increasing the difference in stimulus strength between the two eyes will
reduce the perceptual alternation rate.
IV. Increasing stimulus strength in both eyes while keeping it equal between the
eyes will generally increase the perceptual alternation rate, but this effect may
reverse at near-threshold stimulus strength. (p. 27)
These laws can aid in the interpretation of the various outcome measures of BR, although
it should be noted they do not address mixed percepts.
Based on laws 1 and 2, stimuli with greater predominance and dominance may be
said to possess greater signal strength or salience. This increased signal strength could be
due to a variety of psychological factors including whether a stimulus is a particularly
good exemplar of a stimulus category or perceptual biases, such as a negativity bias. It
should be noted predominance likely reflects initial processing biases, while dominance
reflects greater overall processing. Predominance also appears to be more influenced by
attentional manipulations than dominance durations (Dieter & Tadin, 2011). Based on
law 3, when the brain perceives a stimulus pair as discrepant in their signal strength,
oscillations between the percepts should be reduced. However, increasing the overall
strength of the stimulus pair to both eyes, while maintaining their discrepancy, will
increase oscillation rate. That is, images which the perceiver considers to be similar and
strong in signal strength should result in increased oscillations. For instance, when
viewing a happy and sad face, an individual who considers valence bipolar (i.e., happy
and sadness are opposites, as one goes up the other of necessity goes down) may show
greater oscillations than an individual who views valence as more bivariate (i.e., possible
11

to have high levels of both happiness and sadness). Therefore, stimuli which are
classified as oppositional should show greater rates of oscillation. Similarly, stimulus
pairs with greater overall salience should also induce greater oscillations. For the
purposes of this project, mixed perceptions are considered an index of similarity, with
more similar stimulus pairs producing more mixed percepts. That is, fusion of the images
by the perceivers reflects a similarity between the percepts. Reaction time may also be an
index of the difference in signal strength, with faster reaction times to more discrepant
stimulus pairs. That is, the more dissimilar the images, the quicker the perceiver should
select a single percept to dominate.
The revised laws of binocular rivalry (Brascamp et al., 2015) can be combined with
the double-well potential model for a better understanding of the dynamics underlying
binocular rivalry. For example, when two identical images are viewed binocularly, or a
single image is view monocularly without competing input, perception should fall into a
single well and not oscillate. That is, predominance and dominance should be absolute,
while oscillations or changes between the percepts are nonexistent. By comparison, when
two highly dissimilar images with similar signal strength (e.g., similar on contrast and
arousal but different on valence) are competing, predominance and dominance should be
split between the two images with a high rate of oscillation. That is, perception should be
split between the two perceptual wells with frequent alternations. When two different
neutral faces are presented as compared to a neutral face and a sad face, oscillations may
be similar between the two conditions or slightly lower in the neutral-sad condition, but
dominance would be expected to increase for the sad face. That is, the emotional face
should have a slightly deeper well, or greater salience, than the neutral face, shifting
12

rivalry dynamics. By contrast, comparing a low arousal happy-sad stimulus pair and a
high arousal happy-sad pair would likely yield similar dominance durations but a higher
oscillation rate for the high arousal pair. That is, in both cases dominance may be split
between the percepts, but in the high arousal cases, under Levelt’s 4th law, the stimulus
strength has increased resulting in increased oscillations. Therefore, the multiple outcome
measures of BR can be placed within the context of a bistable, double-well potential
model to help understand how stimulus pairs relate to each other.
Emotion in binocular rivalry
Although limited in volume, BR research with emotional and face stimuli has
revealed several consistent results. Face stimuli are preferentially processed compared to
non-face stimuli (i.e., houses; Bannerman, Milders, De Gelder, & Sahraie, 2008).
Emotional stimuli as compared to neutral stimuli show preferential processing in both
initial percept and total dominance for both scenes (Alpers & Pauli, 2006) and faces
(Alpers & Gerdes, 2007; Bannerman, et al., 2008; Yoon, Hong, Joormann, & Kang,
2009). These effects provide converging evidence for emotional salience when combined
with other paradigms showing similar biases towards attention including dot-probe tasks
(Alpers & Gerdes, 2007; Staugaard, 2009) and emotional pop-out effects in visual search
paradigms (Ohman, Flykt & Esteves, 2001).
Research has also begun to examine how emotion-emotion pairs are processed and
to assess the role of individual differences in BR paradigms. For instance, Yoon et al.,
(2009) compared disgust, happy and neutral faces and found that positive expressions
predominate (positivity bias) over disgust and neutral faces and that higher depressive
symptoms were associated with lower emotional predominance, interpreted as increased
13

attention paid to neutral faces. However, no within-valence pairs were studied. Research
has also shown that anxious individuals are more likely to perceive threatening than
positive stimuli (Gray, Adams, & Garner, 2009; Singer, et al., 2012). These results
suggest that certain biases, such as a preference for faces over non-face information, may
be universal, while others, such as a threat bias within faces, may be more related to
clinically-relevant individual differences.
The results of top-down manipulation of binocular rivalry dynamics have been mixed
(Meng & Tong, 2004; Dieter & Tadin, 2011). However, evidence exists showing
sensitivity to higher cognitive and affective properties consistent with top-down
influence. For example, pairing neutral faces with negative information, as compared to
neutral or positive information, can increase dominance (Anderson, Siegel, Bliss-Moreau,
& Barrett, 2011) but this effect remains contested (Stein, Grubb, Bertrang, Suh, &
Verosky, 2017). Longer dominance for positive faces has also been observed following a
positive mood induction using images (Anderson, Siegel, & Barrett, 2011). Overall, BR
appears sensitive to emotional attributes of stimuli and offers potential insights into how
competing signals are resolved which may depend on individual differences and whether
the stimulus is subjectively perceived.
The current studies
The current studies sought to capitalize upon the competition of emotional
expressions induced via BR to test competing hypotheses about cross- and within-valence
conflict. Specifically, based upon the functional emotional expressions model defined by
Susskind et al., (2007), I tested whether high conflict pairs (i.e., opposites such as happysad and fear-disgust) exhibit different patterns of perception than medium conflict pairs
14

(i.e., happy-fear, disgust-sad) and low conflict pairs (i.e., disgust-happy and fear-sad;
Table 1). Both the valence-arousal circumplex and FEE accounts of emotion predict high
levels of conflict between happy and sad expressions. The valence-arousal circumplex
model does not predict that fear and disgust should result in high levels of conflict, while
the FEE model does. Indirect support for a categorical model of emotion may be implied
if neither valence nor conflict level (perceptual distance) consistently predict perception.
Additionally, after exploring normative patterns, I examined the degree to which these
responses can be modulated with a top-down manipulation (i.e., directed attention).
The first aim (Study 1 and Study 2) of these studies was to replicate previously
documented emotional bias effects, such that emotional faces compared to neutral faces
show both predominance (i.e., are seen first more often) and dominance (i.e., are seen
more overall). Emotional bias was expected for each of the test emotions: fear, disgust,
happy and sad, when compared to neutral.
The second aim (Study 2) of these studies was to extend previous research by
comparing emotion-emotion pairs to detect processing biases (i.e., dominance and
predominance effects between emotions), differences in conflict (i.e., the number of
oscillations between pairs) and differences in conflict resolution (i.e., greater mixed
percepts). Based on previous BR research (Yoon et al., 2009), a positivity bias was
expected such that happy would dominate and predominate over fear, disgust and
sadness. For high conflict pairs compared to low conflict pairs, conflict, as indexed by
oscillations, was expected to be higher and integration, or mixed perceptions, was
expected to be lower. These findings address a current gap in the literature about how
discrete emotions relate to and conflict with each other in a perceptual framework.
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The third aim (Study 3) of the present project was to address the role of directed
attention on these emotional biases. To examine the impact of top-down, directed
attention on these bottom-up biases, participants were asked to focus on a specific kind of
attribute (e.g., positive) and make responses about that attribute (e.g., “Are you seeing a
positive face?”). This simple attentional effect was expected to increase the
predominance and dominance of evaluation congruent stimuli (e.g., more likely to see a
happy face when focused on positive). This effect was examined in the presence of low
(happy-disgust), medium (happy-fear) and high (happy-sad) conflict pairs to explore
potential interactions of conflict with directed attention.
These three aims validate previous research, use BR to explore emotional conflict
and address the extent to which attentional biases can be manipulated via directed
attention. The use of a task with dynamic responses across time offers several advantages
over more traditional forced-choice paradigms and should allow for several indices of
conflict. This work also addresses current gaps in terms of processing biases between
emotional pairs, which has been much less explored than biases of emotional stimuli
compared to neutral stimuli. The use of emotionally expressive faces should engage a
distributed neural network (Haxby, et al., 2000) and reliably reflect how affective
information is processed.
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Chapter Two: Study 1
Study 1 sought to replicate prior work showing predominance and dominance of
emotional faces compared to neutral faces (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007; Bannerman et al.,
2008). Four emotional faces (fear, disgust, happy and sad) were compared to neutral
faces using a BR paradigm with a fifth control condition that paired two identical neutral
faces together. Participants were asked to report whether they were seeing an ‘emotion’
face, a ‘neutral’ face, or a ‘mixed’ percept in all conditions. In all conditions, except the
control, it was hypothesized that emotional faces would predominate and dominate over
neutral ones. These results validate stimulus selection and confirm that emotionally
salient faces receive preferential processing over neutral ones.
Methods
Participants. The target sample size was made based on an estimate by G*Power
for a small effect (.2) with 80% power for a repeated-measures within subject effect with
1 group and 4 observations. This yielded an estimate of 36 participants. However, to
increase power and decrease type II error, guard against unusable data, and because
participants were readily available, a larger sample size was recruited. Participants were
47 undergraduates from the University of Denver participating for course credit. Four
participants were excluded for not completing the task, leaving 43 usable participants.
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The average age of the sample was 19.23 (SD=1.27) and the sample was predominately
female (N=30, 70%).
Procedure. Upon arrival for the session, participants provided informed verbal
consent, before completing a few brief psychometric surveys (i.e., Beck’s Depression
Inventory and Beck’s Anxiety Inventory). Once these were completed, participants were
given instructions for the task. They were told they would see pictures of faces, instructed
about the response options, and were asked to make a response as often as the image
changed. Participants were taken to the experiment room and set up in the stereoscope.
Participants were asked to practice making responses a few times while sitting with their
head in the chin rest. Participants then completed the approximately 20-minute task, were
debriefed and allowed to leave. One break was taken mid-task to allow participants to
rest. All procedures were approved by the Institution Review Board (IRB) at the
University of Denver.
Task and stimuli. Four Caucasian, male actors were selected from the NimStim
Facial Expression set (Tottenham, Borscheid, Ellertsen, Marcus, & Nelson, 2002). Each
image was displayed on a grey background and surrounded by a checkered box to
facilitate spatial alignment. The same actor was presented to each eye within a trial and
trials were shown twice, with stimulus-eye mapping counterbalanced. That is, if a neutral
image was shown to the right eye and a sad image to the left eye, a counter-balanced trial
was also presented with sad shown to the right eye and neutral to the left. A randomized
color overlay of either green or red was applied to each image, such that per trial one

18

image was always green and one was always red. Image display size was 8.5 cm by 8.5
cm (see Figure 1).
The task was Python-based and used PsychoPy (Peirce, 2009) for stimulus display.
The task consisted of five conditions: neutral-neutral, fear-neutral, disgust-neutral, happyneutral and sad-neutral. Participants initially viewed a fixation cross to allow for
calibration of the stereoscope, followed by several instruction screens. Each condition
had 8 trials (4 actors, shown twice) which were randomized in order and lasted 25
seconds. There was a total of 40 trials. Trials were separated by a 2 second instruction
screen. Participants were instructed to report whether they were seeing an emotional or
neutral face using the left and right arrow keys (response-key mappings were
counterbalanced across participants). The down arrow key was used to report a mixed
percept.
Apparatus. The task was displayed on a CRT screen with a resolution of 1024x768
with one image placed on each side of the screen. Participants were seated at a
stereoscope approximately 115 cm from the screen with a black divider running from the
stereoscope to the screen to ensure each eye only perceived a single image.
Analytic plan. Given the interdependence of duration and initial percept responses,
emotional predominance and dominance were computed to reflect an emotional bias and
a mixed percentage. Emotional predominance was computed as
(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 )/ (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 ). Mixed predominance was calculated as the number of trials on
which mixed was the first reported percept divided by the total number of usable trials.
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Emotional dominance was calculated as (𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 ) /
(𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 ). Therefore, values over 0 reflect an emotional
bias and values under 0 reflect a neutral bias for predominance or dominance. Mixed
dominance was calculated as the total duration of that response over the 25s period.
Across all emotion conditions and for each condition, emotional dominance and
predominance were tested against 0. Emotional bias was expected in all except the
neutral-neutral condition.
A RMGLM with one within subject factor (condition) with four levels (fear-neutral,
happy-neutral, sad-neutral, disgust-neutral) was run for emotional dominance, emotional
predominance, mixed dominance, mixed predominance, response latency, and
oscillations. Response latency was the initial delay before the first response. Oscillations
refers to the total number of changes reported during the trial. These analyses address the
degree of conflict observed between-conditions.
Results
Neutral-neutral: manipulation check. The first analyses were conducted to ensure
that neutral stimuli were being reported as neutral. For neutral-neutral pairs, there was an
effect of predominance, t(42)=-14.33, p<.001, d=2.19, such that neutral was reported
more than emotion (M=-.77, SD=.35, 95% CI =[-.88, -.66]). There was also an effect of
dominance, t(42)=-13.95, p<.001, d=2.12, such that neutral was reported more than
emotion (M=-.77, SD=.34, 95% CI =[-.88, -.66]) (Table 2). These results validate that our
neutral stimuli were largely rated as neutral.
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Emotion-neutral. Next, all emotion-neutral conditions were tested for an overall
emotional bias compared to neutral as outlined in the analytic plan. As predicted, there
was an effect of emotional predominance, t(42)=15.88, p<.001, d=2.43 such that emotion
was reported substantially more than neutral (M=.58, SD=.24, 95% CI =[.51, .65]). There
was also an effect of emotional dominance, t(42)=11.53, p<.001, d=1.76, such that
emotion was reported substantially more than neutral (M=.48, SD=.27, 95% CI =[.39,
.56]). Similar dominance and predominance effects were observed in each condition as
well and are reported in Table 2. These results support the hypothesis that emotions
would be preferentially processed compared to neutral faces.
Separate RMGLMs, each with one within-subject factor, condition, with four levels
was run for emotional predominance, emotional dominance, mixed dominance, mixed
predominance, response latency and oscillations (Table 3). There was a main effect of
condition on emotional predominance, F(3, 126)=13.44, p<.001,  2  .24. This effect was
driven by sad-neutral (M=.32, SD=.48, 95% CI=[.17, .46]) having less emotional
predominance than disgust-neutral (M=.58, SD=.35, 95% CI=[.47, .69]), t(42)=3.11,
p<.005, d=.47, fear-neutral (M=.70, SD=.28, 95% CI=[.61, .78]), t(42)=4.96, p<.001,
d=.76, and happy-neutral (M=.71, SD=.36, 95% CI=[.60, 82]), t(42)=4.86, p<.001, d=.74.
Disgust-neutral predominance was also lower than fear-neutral, t(42)=2.35, p<.05, d=.36,
and lower than happy-neutral at the trend level, t(42)=2.00, p=.051, d=.31. There was
also a main effect of condition on emotional dominance, F(3, 126)=18.22, p<.001,  2 
.30. This effect was driven by sad-neutral (M=.24, SD=.47, 95% CI=[.10, .39]) having
less emotional dominance than both fear-neutral (M=.59, SD=.30, 95% CI=[.50, .69]),
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t(42)=5.30, p<.001, d=.81, and happy-neutral (M=.65, SD=.28, 95% CI=[.56, .73]),
t(42)=5.80, p<.001, d=.89. Disgust-neutral (M=.40, SD=.38, 95% CI=[.28, .51]) also
showed less emotional dominance than both fear-neutral, t(42)=4.04, p<.001, d=.62, and
happy-neutral, t(42)=4.68, p<.001, d=.63.
There was a main effect of condition on mixed predominance, F(3, 126)=4.73,
p<.005,  2  .10. This effect was driven by less mixed predominance in the happy-neutral
condition (M=.14, SD=.14, 95% CI=[.09, .18]) than the fear-neutral (M=.18, SD=.18,
95% CI=[.13, .24]), t(42)=2.38, p<.05, d=.36, disgust-neutral (M=.19, SD=.23, 95%
CI=[.12, .26]) , t(42)=2.04, p<.05, d=.31, and sad-neutral conditions (M=.25, SD=.23,
95% CI=[.17, .32]), t(42)=3.66, p<.005, d=.56. There was also less mixed predominance
in the fear-neutral condition than the sad-neutral condition, t(42)=2.15, p<.05, d=.33.
There was a main effect of condition on mixed dominance, F(3, 126)=5.52, p<.005,  2 
.12. This effect was driven by less mixed dominance in the happy-neutral condition
(M=3.17, SD=3.33, 95% CI=[2.15, 4.20]) than the fear-neutral (M=4.37, SD=3.85, 95%
CI=[3.47, 5.84]), t(42)=3.52, p<.005, d=.54, disgust-neutral (M=4.31, SD=3.78, 95%
CI=[3.15, 5.48]), t(42)=2.07, p<.05, d=.32, and sad-neutral conditions (M=5.38,
SD=4.83, 95% CI=[3.89, 6.87]) (see Table 3 for means).
There was also an effect of condition on response latency, F(3, 126)=4.02, p<.01,
 2  .09. This effect was driven by faster responses to happy-neutral (M=2.87, SD=1.55,

95% CI=[2.39, 3.34]) than sad-neutral (M=3.49, SD=1.84, 95% CI=[2.92, 4.05]),
t(42)=2.90, p<.01, d=.44, and disgust-neutral (M=3.36, SD=2.27, 95% CI=[2.67, 4.05]),
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t(42)=2.05, p<.05, d=.31. There were also faster responses to fear-neutral (M=3.09,
SD=1.56, 95% CI=[2.61, 3.57]) than sad-neutral, t(42)=-2.50, p<.05, d=.38.
Finally, there was an effect of condition on oscillations, F(3, 126)=9.52, p<.001,  2 
.19, driven by more changes in the disgust-neutral condition (M=3.28, SD=2.58, 95%
CI=[2.49, 4.08]) than the fear-neutral (M=2.21, SD=1.55, 95% CI=[1.74, 2.69]),
t(42)=5.03, p<.001, d=.77, sad-neutral (M=2.60, SD=2.33, 95% CI=[1.87, 3.31]),
t(42)=2.66, p<.05, d=.41, and happy-neutral conditions (M=2.49, SD=1.95. 95%
CI=[1.89, 3.09]), t(42)=3.41, p<.005, d=.52. There were also more changes in the sadneutral than fear-neutral condition, t(42)=2.10, p<.05, d=.32. Overall, these results
suggest that different mechanisms of resolving conflict (e.g., integration vs. oscillation)
may be employed based on percept similarity.
Discussion
Study 1 replicated prior research showing predominance and dominance for
emotional faces as compared to neutral faces (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007; Bannerman et al.,
2008). Emotional face stimuli receive preferential processing compared to neutral face
stimuli (Bannerman et al., 2008; Yoon et al., 2009). In terms of a double-well potential
model, the brain perceives emotional faces as having a deeper well, or possessing greater
signal strength, than neutral faces. These data provide converging evidence, along with
dot-probe tasks (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007) and visual search tasks (Ohman et al., 2001), for
greater attention being allocated to emotional as compared to neutral stimuli. The
between-condition analyses suggest that different types of conflict resolution may occur
based on the similarity of the emotional expressions. Specifically, happy integrated the
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least with neutral faces while disgust and sadness integrated more as indexed by mixed
predominance and mixed dominance. This implies that sad and disgust faces are
perceived as more similar to neutral faces than happy or fearful faces, as mixed percepts
are considered an index of similarity. There were also more oscillations for the disgustneutral and sad-neutral conditions, than the happy-neutral and fear-neutral conditions,
suggesting that these stimulus pairs were perceived as more equivalent in signal strength.
It remains unknown how attention is allocated in the presence of competing
emotional stimuli. While Study 1 replicated previous research, the use of ‘emotion’ and
‘neutral’ labels cannot be employed in emotion-emotion rivalry paradigms. However,
these emotion-emotion comparisons may offer insight into the relationships between
emotions and allow a test of the levels of conflict predicted by different emotion theories.
Therefore, it was necessary to change response options to further investigate emotionemotion conflict and examine conflict in the context of competing models of emotion.
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Chapter Three: Study 2
Study 2 sought to expand on the results of Study 1 by including emotion-emotion
pairs. Specifically, the same experimental design was used but response options for each
condition were changed to be the emotions portrayed (e.g., “sad” or “happy”, “fear” or
“neutral”) and to “red” or “green” for the neutral-neutral condition. As in Study 1, an
emotional bias in the emotion-neutral conditions in both predominance and dominance
was hypothesized. No effect of color was hypothesized for the neutral-neutral condition.
The three cross-valence pairs were hypothesized to show a positivity bias for happy over
disgust, fear and sadness. In line with the predictions of the FEE and circumplex models,
the oppositional pair of happy-sad was again expected to demonstrate the most conflict
(i.e., most oscillations and least mixing). In line with the FEE model, but not in line with
the circumplex model, within the negative-negative pairs, fear was expected to
predominate and dominate over disgust and was hypothesized to show the most conflict
and least integration. Based off the FEE model, linear effects of conflict (high, medium,
low) were expected to be found in greater predominance, dominance, and oscillations and
decreased mixed predominance and dominance.
Methods
Participants. The target sample size was made based on an estimate by G*Power
for a small effect (.2) with 80% power for a repeated-measures within subject effect with
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1 group and 4 observations. This yielded an estimate of 36 participants. However, to
increase power and decrease type II error, guard against unusable data, and because
participants were readily available, a larger sample size was recruited. Participants were
45 undergraduates from the University of Denver participating for course credit. 6
participants were excluded for not completing the task, leaving 39 usable participants.
The average age of the sample was 19.41 (SD=1.19) and the sample was predominately
female (N=27, 69%).
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Study 1 except now the task was 40
minutes long and included 3 breaks.
Task and stimuli. The stimuli were identical to Study 1. The task was identical
except it now employed a blocked design, trial duration was 20s (as compared to 25s in
Study 1) and response options were changed to reflect the specific emotions in each
condition (e.g., “neutral” or “disgust”, “fear” or “happy”).
Apparatus. The apparatus was identical to Study 1.
Analytic plan. Analysis of the neutral conditions followed the analytic plan used in
Study 1 with the exception that now the neutral-neutral condition was used to test color
bias between red and green. To compare the emotion-emotion conditions, additional
predominance and dominance calculations were required. Predominance for emotionemotion pairs was computed as (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2 )/
(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1 + 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2 ). Dominance for emotion-emotion
pairs was computed such that (𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1 − 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2 )/
(𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1 + 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2 ).These values were tested against 0 to
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determine whether emotional pairs displayed stable patterns of dominance and
predominance.
For the emotional pairs, a 2x3 RMGLM was conducted to examine the relationship
of pair type (cross- or within-valence) and conflict type (high, medium, low; see Table 1)
for predominance, dominance, mixed perceptions, mixed predominance, response latency
and oscillations. As predominance and dominance have different anchors betweenconditions, the absolute values of these measures were used to facilitate comparison. A
main effect of conflict type was expected such that the high conflict (fear-disgust and
happy-sad) pairs show the least mixing and most conflict.
Results
Neutral-neutral manipulation check. The first analyses were conducted to
check whether color biased reporting on the neutral-neutral trials. For neutral-neutral
pairs, there was no effect of predominance, t(38)=-1.83, p>.05, d=.29, such that red was
not reported more than green (M=-.17, SD=.59, 95% CI=[-.37, .02]). There was also no
effect of dominance, t(38)=1.15, p>.05, d=.18 such that red was not reported more than
green (M=.06, SD=.34, 95% CI=[-.048, .17]). These results suggest that the color
overlays were not biasing reporting.
Emotion-neutral. First, all emotion-neutral conditions were collapsed across to
assess any emotional bias in predominance and dominance. There was an effect of
predominance, t(38)=6.05, p<.001, d=.97, such that emotional faces were more likely to
be the initial percept (M=.25, SD=.26, 95% CI=[.17, .33]). There was also an effect of
dominance, t(38)=5.67, p<.001, d=.91, such that emotional faces were seen longer than
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neutral faces (M=.17, SD=.18, 95% CI=[.11, .23]). Next, the emotion-neutral pairings
were examined individually and are reported in Table 4. Briefly, there were
predominance and dominance effects for the fear-neutral and happy-neutral conditions,
all p’s <.001, but not for the disgust-neutral and sad-neutral conditions (Table 4). These
results offer a partial replication of the emotional bias effect observed in Study 1. Overall
these effects support the expected emotional bias effects, driven primarily by happy and
fearful expressions.
A RMGLM with one within subject factor, condition, with four levels was run for
emotional predominance, emotional dominance, mixed predominance, mixed dominance,
response latency and oscillations (Table 5). There was a main effect of condition on
emotional predominance, F(3, 114)=11.76, p<.001,  2  .24. This effect was driven by
sad-neutral (M=.12, SD=.50, 95% CI=[-.04, .28]) having less emotional predominance
than fear-neutral (M=.31, SD=.37, 95% CI=[.19, .43]), t(38)=-2.29, p<.05, d=.37, and
happy-neutral (M=.48, SD=.39, 95% CI=[.36, .61]), t(38)=-3.64, p<.005, d=.58. Disgustneutral (M=-.02, SD=.44, 95% CI=[-.16, .13]) also displayed less predominance than the
fear-neutral, t(38)=-3.69, p<.005, d=.59, and happy-neutral conditions, t(38)=-5.16,
p<.001, d=.83. There was also a stronger predominance in the happy-neutral condition
than the fear-neutral condition, t(38)=-2.06. p<.05, d=.33.
There was a main effect of condition on emotional dominance, F(3, 114)=16.66,
p<.001,  2  .31. This effect was driven by disgust-neutral (M=-.06, SD=.30, 95% CI=[.15, .04]) having no emotional dominance, which was significantly less than the
dominance observed for fear-neutral (M=.19, SD=.27, 95% CI=[.10, .27]) , t(38)=-3.41.
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p<.005, d=.55, and happy-neutral (M=.43, SD=.33, 95% CI=[.32, .54]), t(38)=-6.72.
p<.001, d=.1.08. There was also stronger dominance in the happy-neutral condition than
the fear-neutral condition, t(38)=3.54. p<.005, d=.57, and the sad-neutral condition
(M=.05, SD=.37, 95% CI=[-.07, .17]), t(38)=5.12, p<.001, d=.82.
There was no significant effect of condition on mixed predominance, F(3,
114)=1.07, p>.05,  2  .03. There was no significant effect of condition on mixed
dominance, F(3, 114)=.25, p>.05,  2  .01. There was no significant effect of condition
on response latency, F(3, 114)=2.03, p>.05,  2  .05.
There was an effect of condition on oscillations, F(3, 114)=6.00, p<.005,  2  .14.
This effect was driven by disgust-neutral (M=3.95, SD=2.99, 95% CI=[2.98, 4.92])
having more changes than both fear-neutral (M=3.04, SD=2.36, 95% CI=[2.27, 3.80]),
t(38)=2.94, p<.01, d=.47, and sad-neutral (M=2.58, SD=1.82, 95% CI=[1.99, 3.17]),
t(38)=3.41, p<.005, d=.55. Happy-neutral (M=3.26, SD=2.17, 95% CI=[2.56, 3.96]) also
had more oscillations on average than the sad-neutral condition, t(38)=2.56, p<.05, d=.41.
These effects replicate those observed in Study 1 for the most oscillations in the disgustneutral condition.
Emotion-emotion. For the six emotional pairs, predominance and dominance
ratios were first tested against 0 (Table 4). For the cross-valence pairs, happy
predominated over disgust (M=.20, SD=.40, 95% CI=[.08, .33]), t(38)=3.21, p<.005,
d=.51, and, at a trend level, sadness (M=.16, SD=.51, 95% CI=[-.01, .33]), t(38)=1.94,
p<.10, d=.31. Happy did not predominate over fear (M=.05, SD=.47, 95% CI=[-.10,
.20]), t(38)=.70, p>.05, d=.11. For the within-valence pairs, fear predominated over
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disgust (M=.20, SD=.50, 95% CI=[.04, .36]), t(38)=2.57, p<.05, d=.41, and sadness
(M=.45, SD=.43, 95% CI=[.31, .59]), t(38)=6.44, p<.001, d=1.02. There was no
significant effect of predominance for sad over disgust (M=.03, SD=.41, 95% CI=[-.10,
.17]), t(38)=.51, p>.05, d=.08.
For the cross-valence pairs, happy dominated over disgust (M=.26, SD=.27, 95%
CI=[.17, .34]), t(38)=5.95, p<.001, d=.95, sadness (M=.25, SD=.31, 95% CI=[.15, .35]),
t(38)=5.07, p<.001, d=.81, and, at the trend level, fear (M=.10, SD=.33, 95% CI=[-.01,
.20]), t(38)=1.87, p>.10, d=.30. For the within-valence pairs, fear dominated over disgust
(M=.23, SD=.36, 95% CI=[.12, .35]), t(38)=4.02, p<.001, d=.64, and sadness (M=.26,
SD=.36, 95% CI=[.14, .37]), t(38)=4.51, p<.001, d=.72. There was no significant effect
of dominance for sad over disgust (M=.06, SD=.27, 95% CI=[-.03, .15]), t(38)=1.39,
p>.05, d=.22.
For the emotional pairs, a 2x3 RMGLM was conducted to examine the
relationship of pair type (cross or within valence) and conflict level (high, medium, low;
see Table 1) for absolute predominance, absolute dominance, mixed perceptions, mixed
predominance, response latency and oscillations (See Table 6 for means). There was a
main effect of conflict on predominance, F(2, 76)=10.31, p<.001,  2  .21 (Figure 2 A),
but in the opposite direction as predicted. The lowest level of conflict (M=.33, SD=.26,
95% CI=[.24, .41]) had more predominance than both the high (M=.18, SD=.31, 95%
CI=[.08, .28]), t(38)=-2.11, p<.05, d=.34, and medium conflict levels (M=.04, SD=.32,
95% CI=[-.06, .15]), t(38)=-4.52, p<.001, d=.72. There was also more predominance in
the high compared to medium conflict level, t(38)=2.50, p<.05, d=.40.
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There was a main effect of conflict on dominance, F(2, 76)=10.66, p<.001,  2 
.22 (Figure 2 B). This was driven by the medium level of conflict (M=.08, SD=.23, 95%
CI=[.00, .15]) having less emotional dominance than both the high (M=.24, SD=.23, 95%
CI=[.17, .32]), t(38)=5.04, p<.001, d=.81, and low conflict levels (M=.26, SD=.24, 95%
CI=[.18, .34]), t(38)=3.58, p<.005, d=.57.
There was no significant effect of conflict or valence on mixed predominance.
There was an interaction of conflict and valence on mixed duration, F(2,
76)=4.29, p<.05,  2  .10 (Figure 3). Within the cross-valence pairs, this was driven by
disgust-happy (low conflict; M=3.98, SD=3.16, 95% CI=[2.95, 5.00]) having lower
mixed durations compared to both happy-sad (high conflict; M=4.80, SD=3.02, 95%
CI=[3.82, 5.77]), t(38)=-2.29, p<.05, d=.37, and happy-fear (medium conflict; M=5.58,
SD=3.56, 95% CI=[4.42, 6.73]), t(38)=-3.53, p<.005, d=.57. Within the within-valence
pairs, there were no differences in mixed duration between fear-disgust (high conflict;
M=4.06, SD=2.86, 95% CI=[3.13, 4.98]), disgust-sad (medium conflict; M=4.24,
SD=2.47, 95% CI=[3.44, 5.04]), and fear-sad (low conflict; M=4.55, SD=2.96, 95%
CI=[3.59, 5.51]), all p’s >.05.
For response latency, there was a main effect of valence, F(2, 76)=9.71, p<.005,
 2  .20 (Figure 4). This was driven by cross-valence pairs (M=2.86, SD=1.59, 95%

CI=[2.35, 3.38]) having faster responses than within-valence pairs (M=3.25, SD=1.52,
95% CI=[2.76, 3.75]), t(38)=-3.12, p<.005, d=.50.
For oscillations, there was a main effect of valence, F(1, 38)=9.04, p<.01,  2 
.19, a main effect of conflict, F(2, 76)=6.51, p<.005,  2  .15, and an interaction, F(2,
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76)=6.43, p<.005,  2  .15 (Figure 5). To break down the two-way interaction, effects of
conflict were examined at each level of valence (cross- and within-). For the crossvalence pairs, there was no effect of conflict on oscillations, F(2, 76)=1.45, p>.05,  2 
.04. For the within-valence pairs, there was an effect of conflict, F(2, 76)=9.83, p<.001,
 2  .21. This was driven by fewer changes in the fear-sad (low conflict; M=2.38,

SD=1.85, 95% CI=[2.08, 3.28]) than the fear-disgust (high conflict; M=3.43, SD=2.68,
95% CI=[2.57, 4.30]), t(38)=-3.08, p<.005, d=.49, and the disgust-sad (medium conflict;
M=3.61, SD=2.52, 95% CI=[2.79, 4.43]), t(38)=-3.95, p<.001, d=.63. Overall, these
findings offer support of the effects observed in Study 1 and extend them to included
emotion-emotion pairs. Limited support was found for linear effects of conflict, although
limited to the within-valence pairs, and non-linear conflict effects were observed in
predominance, dominance, and mixed duration.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to replicate the effects of Study 1 (i.e., demonstrate
preferential processing of emotional compared to neutral stimuli) and expand results to
include emotion-emotion pairs (e.g., establish emotion-emotion preferential processing).
Results of Study 2 partially replicate those of Study 1. Specifically, emotional
predominance and dominance were observed, however, they were limited to the happy
and fearful expressions. This discrepancy between Study 1 and Study 2 may best be
understood in terms of changing the criteria of the task. As mentioned previously, SR
systems contain at minimum three components: a weak coherent input (signal), a
threshold allowing a non-linear response (discrete outcome), and at least one source of
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noise (Gammaitoni, et al., 1998). In this model, there could be different thresholds for
classifying a face as generally emotional, as in Study 1, and as a specific emotion (i.e.,
sad or fearful), as in Study 2. Additionally, within the emotion-neutral pairs, disgustneutral again displayed the most oscillations of any pair, suggesting those stimulus pairs
have the most similarity in terms of signal strength.
This study also assessed emotion-emotion conflict allowing me to address one
central question of my project. Namely, are there stable emotion-emotion biases and if so,
can their degree of conflict be indexed via the dynamic measures of binocular rivalry.
Results do support processing biases, namely a positivity bias and a fear bias, but do not
support the linear effects of conflict predicted by the FEE model. This suggests that
specific emotional expressions may vary in their signal strength, resulting in stable
perceptual biases. High conflict in the happy-sad condition is predicted by both models,
while only the FEE model predicts high levels of conflict during the fear-disgust
condition. Results do not strongly support either a valence-arousal circumplex model or
the FEE model, but rather suggest a discrete, hierarchy of emotions such that happy
expressions are preferentially processed, followed by fear, and then sad and disgust.
Now that emotion-emotion response patterns have been established, exploring the
impact of top-down, directed attention on this dynamic conflict could offer insight into
the degree to which such biases may be volitionally modulated. As BR paradigms are
sensitive to both bottom-up and top-down processes (Anderson, et al., 2011a, Anderson,
et al., 2011b), it may be possible to influence emotional conflict as it unfolds.
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Chapter Four: Study 3
Study 3 examined the role of a top-down, directed attention manipulation on this
binocular rivalry task by asking participants to focus on a key parameter of the stimuli
with appropriate response ratings. Previous research has shown that pairing neutral faces
with negative information, as opposed to neutral or positive information, can increase
dominance (Anderson, et al., 2011b) and longer dominance for positive faces is observed
following a positive mood induction using images (Anderson, et al., 2011a). However,
yet to be examined in the context of BR is the effect of directed attention on dominance
and predominance. Amygdala activation has been shown to track with stimulus attributes
congruent with evaluative goals (Cunningham, Van Bavel, & Johnsen, 2008; Lumian &
McRae, 2017). That is, more amygdala activation is seen in response to positive stimuli
when participants focused on positive attributes than when focused on negative. Using
cross-valence stimuli, allows for valence-specific directed attention which should change
how the images are processed.
The three cross valence stimuli pairings were used: happy-sad, happy-fear, and
happy-disgust. Three attentional goal conditions were used: no focus, focus on positivity
and focus on negativity. Their respective response options were: “positive” or “negative”,
“positive” or “not” and “negative” or “not”. Again, a blocked design with breaks to
practice the new rating scale was employed and condition order was randomized across
34

participants. The primary comparisons of interest were the no focus evaluation conditions
with the focus positive and focus negative. Evidence of top-down control was taken as
any significant difference that aligns with directed attention. That is, increased happy
reported in the positive focus or more negative percepts reported in the negative focus
condition as compared to the no focus condition. I hypothesized that fit effects would be
observed, such that there is greater dominance and predominance for the attended to
stimulus.
Methods
Participants. Based on the same power analysis as Study 1, a target sample of at
least 36 people was selected. However, due to time constrains, a slightly smaller sample
was recruited. Participants were 31 undergraduates from the University of Denver
participating for course credit or monetary compensation. Two participants were
excluded for not completing the task, and one participant was excluded for having
outlying values (>3SD) on dominance ratios, leaving 28 usable participants. The sample
was college-aged (M=19.85, SD=2.59) and just over half female (n=17, 59%).
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Study 2, except that different evaluative
goals were explicitly given before each appropriate block of trials. Before the experiment
participants were informed they would be seeing faces and be asked to change their
evaluative focus of the stimuli. During the no focus condition, participants were told to
give even focus to both positive and negative stimulus features and rated stimuli as either
“positive”, “negative”, or “mixed”. During the positive focus, block participants were
told to focus on positive stimulus features and rated stimuli as either “positive”, “not
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positive”, or “mixed”. During the negative focus block, participants were told to focus on
the negative stimulus features and rated the stimuli as “negative”, “not negative”, or
“mixed”. Given the blocked design and changing response options, a break occurred each
block so that participants could practice the new response options prior to that condition.
Task and stimuli. The stimuli and task used were identical to Study 2 with the
following changes: responses were paired with an evaluative goal and only cross-valence
stimuli were used (happy-disgust, happy-sad, happy-fear). Therefore, participants viewed
each of the trials 3x (once per evaluative condition) for a total of 9 conditions.
Apparatus. The apparatus was identical to Study 1 and Study 2.
Analytic plan. Unlike Study 1 and Study 2, there was no neutral-neutral control
condition to analyze. Within-condition analyses on dominance and predominance were
conducted as outlined in Study 2. Response options were changed to be appropriate with
the new responses (e.g., positive, negative, and mixed). Namely, dominance and
predominance indices were calculated and tested for each condition against 0.
Differences in the evaluative conditions were tested using a 3x3 RMGLM for each
conflict level (high/happy-sad, medium/happy-fear and low/happy-disgust) and each
evaluative condition (no focus, positive and negative) for both dominance and
predominance. Effects were also examined for evaluative condition and conflict level on
response latency, mixed perceptions, mixed predominance and oscillations. These
analyses address the degree of influence of top-down goals observed and a main effect of
evaluative condition was expected. That is, dominance and predominance should show fit
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effects based on the evaluative goal (e.g., more positive (negative) dominance in the
positive (negative) focus condition).
Results
Within-condition. Based on Study 2 results, happy was expected to predominate
and dominate over disgust, fear, and sadness. The first set of analyses examined the
predominance and dominance ratios within each evaluative condition. For happy
predominance, as expected, there was an effect across all conditions (M=.20, SD=.21,
95% CI=[.12, .28]), t(27)=4.98, p<.001, d=.94. This predominance effect was observed in
the no focus condition (M=.18, SD=.26, 95% CI=[.08, .28]), t(27)=3.71, p<.005, d=.70,
the positive focus condition (M=.31, SD=.28, 95% CI=[.20, .42]), t(27)=5.90, p<.001,
d=1.11, and in the negative focus condition (M=.13, SD=.30, 95% CI=[.02, .25]),
t(27)=2.34, p<.05, d=.43. Means for each condition are reported in Table 7.
For happy dominance, there was an effect across all conditions (M=.18, SD=.13,
95% CI=[.13, .23], t(27)=7.05, p<.001, d=1.33. This dominance effect was observed in
the no focus condition (M=.18, SD=.17, 95% CI=[.11, .24]), t(27)=5.64, p<.001, d=1.06,
the positive focus condition (M=.26, SD=.23, 95% CI=[.17, .35]), t(27)=5.81, p<.001,
d=1.10, and in the negative focus condition (M=.13, SD=.24, 95% CI=[.03, .22]),
t(27)=2.77, p<.05, d=.52. Within each focus condition, there were effects of
predominance and dominance such that positive was reported more often than negative
perception. Means for each condition are reported in Table 8.
Between-condition. An effect of evaluative condition was hypothesized such that
positivity biases were expected to be stronger in the positive focus condition than in the
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no focus condition and weaker in the negative focus groups. 3x3 RMGLM’s with
evaluative condition (no focus, focus positive, focus negative) and conflict level
(high/disgust-happy, medium/fear-happy, and low/sad-happy) were run on predominance
ratios, dominance ratios, mixed predominance, mixed dominance, response latency, and
oscillations. For happy predominance, there was a main effect of evaluative condition,
F(2, 54)=5.76, p<.01,  2  .18, and a trend level main effect of conflict, F(2, 54)=2.55,
p<.10,  2  .09 (Table 7 and Figure 6 A). The effect of evaluative condition was driven by
greater happy predominance in the positive focus condition (M=.33, SD=.28, 95%
CI=[.22, .44]) compared to the negative focus condition (M=.12, SD=.31, 95% CI=[-.01,
.24]), t(27)=2.50, p<.05, d=.47, and the no focus condition (M=.18, SD=.27, 95%
CI=[.08, .28]), t(27)=2.20, p<.05, d=.42. The trend effect of conflict was driven by
greater happy predominance in the high conflict, sad-happy condition (M=.27, SD=.30,
95% CI=[.16, .39]) compared to the medium conflict, fear-happy condition (M=.14,
SD=.29, 95% CI=[.02, .25]), t(27)=2.20, p<.05, d=.41. The low conflict, disgust-happy
condition (M=.19, SD=.26, 95% CI=[.09, .29]) did not differ from either of the other two
conditions, all p’s>.05. This effect of conflict on happy predominance replicates the
effects observed in Study 2, with the medium conflict, happy-fear condition showing the
least predominance.
For happy dominance, there was a main effect of evaluative condition, F(2,
54)=3.60, p<.05,  2  .12, and a main effect of conflict, F(2, 54)=5.21, p<.01,  2  .16
(Table 8 and Figure 6 B). The effect of evaluative condition is best characterized by
greater happy dominance in the positive focus condition (M=.26, SD=.23, 95% CI=[.17,
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.35]) compared to the no focus condition (M=.18, SD=.17, 95% CI=[.11, .24]),
t(27)=1.66, p=.11, d=.31, and the negative focus condition (M=.13, SD=.24, 95%
CI=[.03, .22]), t(27)=1.89, p=.07, d=.36, although pairwise comparisons failed to reach
traditional significance thresholds (p<.05). The effect of conflict was driven by greater
happy dominance in the high conflict, sad-happy condition (M=.28, SD=.21, 95%
CI=[.20, .36]) compared to the medium conflict, fear-happy condition (M=.12, SD=.21,
95% CI=[.04, .20]), t(27)=3.81, p<.005, d=.73, and the low conflict, disgust-happy
condition (M=.15, SD=.21, 95% CI=[.07, .24]), t(27)=2.40, p<.05, d=.45.
There was no significant effect of evaluative focus on mixed predominance but
there was an effect of conflict level, F(2, 54)=4.91, p<.05,  2  .15 (See Table 9 for
means). The effect of conflict was driven by greater mixed predominance in the medium
conflict, fear-happy condition (M=30.51, SD=20.88, 95% CI=[22.41, 38.60]) compared
to the low conflict, disgust-happy condition (M=24.11, SD=19.52, 95% CI=[16.54,
31.68]), t(27)=2.95, p<.01, d=.56, and, at the trend level, from the high conflict, sadhappy condition (M=26.49, SD=19.42, 95% CI=[18.96, 34.02]), t(27)=2.02, p<.01,
d=.40.
There was a main effect of conflict level on mixed dominance, F(2, 54)=4.73,
p<.05,  2  .15. This effect was driven by the medium conflict, fear-happy condition
(M=4.33, SD=2.97, 95% CI=[3.18, 5.49]) displaying more mixed dominance than the
low conflict, disgust-happy condition (M=3.58, SD=2.85, 95% CI=[2.47, 4.68]),
t(27)=2.95, p<.01, d=.56 and, at the trend level, the high conflict, happy-sad condition
(M=3.86, SD=2.99, 95% CI=[2.70, 5.02]), t(27)=1.88, p<.01, d=.36.
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There was a trend level main effect of evaluative condition on response latency,
F(2, 54)=2.54, p<.10,  2  .09. This effect was driven by a trend for faster responses in
the no focus condition (M=2.53, SD=1.13, 95% CI=[2.13, 2.99]) compared to the
negative focus condition (M=2.87, SD=1.30, 95% CI=[2.36, 3.37]), t(27)=1.88, p<.10,
d=.35. The positive focus condition (M=2.69, SD=1.27, 95% CI=[2.19, 3.18]) did not
differ from the other two conditions, all p’s>.05.
There was no significant effect of evaluative condition or level of conflict on
oscillations.
Discussion
The aim of Study 3 was to ascertain the degree to which emotional biases may be
modulated by top-down, directed attention instructions. This task expands on Study 2 by
examining the role of directed attention using three cross-valence emotional pairs. The
no-focus condition mirrored the results from Study 2 for the corresponding conditions.
That is, happy predominated and dominated fear, disgust and sadness in the no focus
condition. These attentional biases were expected to be modulated by top-down
evaluative goals such that stronger negative (positive) dominance occurs in the negative
(positive) focus condition. In line with other work on similar evaluative goals
(Cunningham et al., 2008; Lumian & McRae, 2017), increased perception was expected,
and found, to be given to the attended-to evaluative goal. Specifically, attending to
positive attributes boosted the predominance and dominance of happy perception, while
attending to negative attributes failed to change any measure of binocular rivalry. This
asymmetrical effect, in line with previous work (Cunningham et al., 2008; Lumian &
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McRae, 2017), suggests that it may be easier to boost positivity biases than to reduce
negative biases. In terms of a SR system, these effects may have been obtained by either
shifting the threshold for a given response or modulating internal noise to boost the SNR
for the positive stimuli in the positive focus condition. The lack of effect for negativity
suggests that positivity may be the more malleable of the two. Therefore, support was
found for a modulation of positivity but not for negativity.
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Chapter Five: Discussion
Emotional faces were used here in combination with BR to show that a)
emotional stimuli are preferentially processed compared to neutral stimuli, b) positive
emotional expressions dominate over all negative expressions, c) fear dominates over
other negative expressions and d) that these processing biases can be modulated by topdown attention in the context of BR. In line with other work (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007;
Bannerman, et al., 2008; Yoon, et al., 2009), Study 1 offered clear support of a
processing bias favoring emotional compared to neutral faces, an effect partially
replicated in Study 2. Of note, the disgust-neutral and sad-neutral comparisons showed
relatively weak effects in Study 1 and no effects in Study 2, while fear-neutral and happyneutral showed robust effects in both Study 1 and Study 2. A positivity bias was
demonstrated in both predominance and dominance for both Study 2 and Study 3,
replicating previous work by Yoon and colleagues (2009). In Study 2, fear was also
shown to predominate and dominate over other negative emotions (i.e., sad, disgust).
This fear dominance helps bolster claims for the preferential processing of fearful stimuli
(see Öhman & Mineka, 2001), but is novel in the sense that there are few previous reports
of within-valence emotion comparisons. Finally, Study 3 also showed that the positivity
bias observed in Study 2 (and the no focus condition in Study 3) can be facilitated by
asking participants to attend to positivity. This study adds to a small body of literature
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showing top-down manipulation effects in BR paradigms (Anderson, et al., 2011a,
Anderson, et al., 2011b) and is consistent with other effects of top-down manipulation of
emotional information processing (Cunningham et al., 2008; Lumian & McRae, 2017).
Emotional bias
The emotional bias observed in Study 1 and Study 2 suggests that emotional
stimuli are processed preferentially or, in terms of Levelt’s revised laws (Brascamp et al.,
2015), have greater stimulus strength than neutral stimuli. That is, perceivers direct more
attention, whether implicitly or explicitly, to certain stimulus groups. Furthermore, results
suggest that happy and fearful expressions are stronger than sad and disgust faces given
their greater dominance durations and more robust effects (i.e., being observed in Study 1
and Study 2). That is, perceivers are more likely to allow fearful and happy expressions
to reach conscious awareness than other specific emotion categories. In terms of a
double-well potential system, these effects can be explained as the emotional input
having a deeper well, or greater attraction potential, than the neutral stimuli resulting in
the emotional percept being dominance more often. Psychologically, this salience may be
related to better or more examplars for some categories. For example, the emotional bias
observed for sad and disgust in Study 1 but not Study 2 may be related to the fact that in
Study 1 participants were asked to categorize faces as emotional or not, whereas in Study
2 they were asked to categorize specific emotions. That is, the category of “emotional
face” may have better examplars and therefore more salience than the specific emotion
labels. It may be easier for individuals to classify faces by the more general emotionneutral criterion than by specific emotion criterion.
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It was also observed that oscillations for the emotion-neutral pairs were highest
for the disgust-neutral pairings in both Study 1 and Study 2. This would suggest,
according to Levelt’s 3rd law, that these stimuli were the most similar. In terms of a
double-well system, this would mean that the competing wells were close to equivalent
resulting in high levels of oscillations since perception is equally split between both
wells/percepts. In these cases, the brain has trouble remaining in a stable percept because
the competition between the competing wells is so strong. Whereas, for strongly
mismatched stimuli, such as the happy-neutral conditions, there was more unequal
dominance and fewer oscillations.
Positivity bias
The positivity bias observed in Study 2 and Study 3 suggests that positive stimuli
are preferentially processed compared to negative stimuli. In a double-well potential
framework, this suggests that positive stimuli have a deeper well or are stronger attractors
of attention than negative stimuli. This expands on previous research which has shown an
attentional bias for positive compared to neutral stimuli (Pool, Brosch, Delplanque, &
Sander, 2015). Despite considerable theoretical and empirical evidence to support a
negativity bias (see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin &
Royzman, 2001), our results support a preferential bias towards positive stimuli. This
bias was previously reported in Yoon et al., (2009) with disgust and happy facial
expressions in a BR paradigm. Theoretically, a positivity offset has been proposed such
that, at low levels of arousal, the positive motivational system responds more strongly
than the negative motivational system (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 2997; Ito &
Cacioppo, 2005). There is also evidence for faster processing of positive compared to
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negative information (Unkelbach, Fiedler, Bayer, Stegmuller, & Danner, 2008) proposed
to be driven by a higher density of positive information in memory. These data add to a
growing literature on the preferential processing of positive compared to negative
information, such as faster recognition for happy faces than negative emotion faces
(Hugdahl, Iversen, & Johnsen, 1993; Kirita & Endo, 1995), and challenge the negativity
bias observed in many psychological processes.
Fear bias
Also observed in Study 2 was a fear bias compared to sadness and disgust. This
bias suggests that fearful stimuli are preferentially processed, or are stronger attractors,
compared to other negative emotions and is in line with accounts of fear stimuli eliciting
automatic and rapid appraisals (Ohman & Mineka, 2001). Of note, this is not a threat
distinction, as disgust, which is also a threat response (Curtis, Aunger, & Rabie, 2004),
failed to dominate over sadness. However, it should also be noted that research has
indicated that fearful stimuli are preferentially processed compared to happy stimuli
(Yang, Zaid, & Blake, 2007) and theoretically a negativity bias is strongly supported
(Baumeister, et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). While it’s hard to integrate these
conflicting results, the current studies put the emotion pairs into direct competition as
compared to Yang et al., (2007) in which emotion types were compared across trials
under continuous flash suppression. Therefore, the presence of ambivalence, or the cooccurrence of positive and negative emotional information, may play a role in
understanding these discrepant results. Overall these studies suggest a fear bias compared
to other negative emotions, but not compared to positive emotions.
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Structure of emotion
These studies were designed to investigate the perceptual relatedness of emotional
expressions using BR. Specifically, degree of conflict, as predicted by distance in the
FEE model, was expected to be indexed via the multiple outcomes of BR. Although
linear effects supporting the FEE model were not found (e.g., increased mixed perception
with decreasing distance), the multiple assessments of BR did offer novel insight into
how emotional conflict is resolved. Predominance and dominance effects were found for
emotional compared to neutral stimuli, for positive compared to negative stimuli and for
fear over disgust and sadness. These effects offer insight into how the brain encodes
competing signals and resolves emotional conflict. Differences in mixed perceptions
were also found for some stimulus pairs, suggesting different ways of resolving
perceptual conflict (e.g., happy-neutral had less mixing than other stimulus pairs in Study
1). Increased mixed percepts in this context were considered indices of similarity, with
stimuli pairs which are perceived as more similar yielding greater mixed perceptions.
From a double-well potential framework, mixed perceptions may arise from an overlap of
the two perceptual wells. Oscillations may index a different aspect of conflict, as
oscillations were highest in the disgust-neutral condition in Study 1 and Study 2
compared to the other emotion-neutral conditions. No other measures showed the
strongest effects for the disgust-neutral condition. This effect, interpreted in Levelt’s 3rd
proposition (discussed above; Brascamp et al., 2015), resulted from very similar stimuli
strength of the percept pairs. That is, the brain encodes them similarly. Also of note, in
Study 2 there were more oscillations for cross-valence as compared to within-valence
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pairs. This effect is likely due to the oppositional nature of positive and negative valence,
which may result in greater mutual inhibition and therefore faster adaptation between the
attractor states. In terms of Levelt’s revised 4th proposition (Brascamp et al., 2015), these
oppositional pairs are perceived as having higher competing signal strength than within
valence pairs. Despite the lack of clear support for either a valence-arousal or FEE
dimensional model of emotion, BR remains useful as a tool for investigating emotional
conflict.
Because the results from these studies fail to unambiguously support either
dimensional model, they may be interpreted as support for discrete emotion theory. The
valence-arousal model would have been supported by strong cross-valence effects and
the FEE model would have been supported by strong linear conflict effects. Lack of
consistent effects may suggest that the target emotions are not organized in a continuous
way, therefore indirectly supporting a categorical model of emotion. One argument for
discrete emotion theories is that some neural regions appear partially specialized for
evaluating specific categories of emotion. The amygdala is thought to be critical for fear
evaluation (Adolphs et al., 1994; Whalen et al., 1998) and the anterior insula for disgust
evaluation (Calder, et al., 2000; Phillips et al., 1997; Phillips et al., 1998). Response to
happy faces have also been documented in the amygdala (Breiter, et al., 1996), however,
its likely smiling faces, as a form of social reward (Shore & Heerey, 2011), recruit
additional reward related circuitry, such as the striatum (Izuma, Saito, & Sadato, 2008).
Responses to sad faces have been observed in the amygdala (Blair, Morris, Frith, Perrett,
& Dolan, 1999), however, the subcallosal cingulate is also commonly associated with
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sadness (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002). Specific neural substrates for each
emotion may suggest that they do not operate in a continuous space (i.e., there are not
valence and arousal substrates) but rather have unique idiosyncratic relationships to each
other. However, emotion localization remains controversial and more recent theories
implicate large brain networks as underlying emotion processing (Barrett & Satpute,
2013; Chang, Gianaros, Manuck, Krishnan, & Wager, 2015). Therefore, these results
could suggest either localized competition between neural regions or competition within
a more general emotion network.
Top-down influences
Top-down influences (i.e. directed attention) can greatly impact visual processing
(Gilbert & Li, 2013). Despite this fact, prior researchers have suggested that BR
paradigms are more influenced by bottom-up than top-down influences (Meng & Tong,
2004; Dieter & Tadin, 2011). Contrary to these claims, in Study 3 we found support for
top-down modulation of high-level visual stimuli (i.e., face stimuli) by manipulating the
response options and attention to particular stimulus features. Specifically, perception of
positive stimuli was facilitated when response options emphasized positivity, while no
change was observed when response options emphasized negativity. This effect suggests
that the positivity bias observed in Study 2 may be malleable and under the influence of
top-down mechanisms. In terms of a SR system, these effects can be explained as either a
shifting of the threshold or modulation of internal noise to bolster the attended to signal.
As a double-well potential system, this can be conceptualized either as an explicit
deepening of the attended to well or a slight tilting of the wells which biases perception
towards the attended to percept. These results replicate asymmetrical influences of top48

down manipulations on emotion processing (Cunningham et al., 2008; Lumian & McRae,
2017). It is unknown whether this asymmetry indicates natural prioritization of positivity
from the top-down or merely that the attended-to stimulus attributes receive preferential
processing, an effect that could be mediated by the amygdala, which feeds back into
visual cortex processing (Adolphs, 2004). Also of note was the lack of emotion
domination for sad and disgust faces in Study 2, which failed to replicate the emotional
bias observed in Study 1. It is possible that changing response options that were used in
Study 2 (compared to Study 1), while holding the stimuli constant had an impact on task
performance. Specifically, it’s possible that the more general emotion-neutral response
options used in Study 1 directed attention in a way that emphasized emotion vs. neutral
differences, while the specific emotion labels used in Study 2 might have resulted in a
higher criterion for selection. That is, individuals may be more willing to classify a face
as generally emotional (or not neutral) than as a specific emotion. It is also possible that
changing from a randomized trial order to a blocked-design altered performance on the
task. Therefore, it is important to consider response options, directed attention, trial order
and potential framing effects when conducting BR future studies.
Limitations
There are several limitations to the current studies. First, the face stimuli used are
not the same as those used by Susskind et al., (2007) whose model was the basis for the
hypothesized perceptual differences. Use of the NimStim set added more variability in
data collected as the facial expressions were not as standardized, classified with the
Facial Action Coding System (FACS), or staged as those used previously. However, use
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of the NimStim did help to generalize from previous BR research (e.g., Bannerman et al.,
2008, Yoon et al., 2009) which employed different face sets (e.g., from Ekman &
Friesen, 1976). The emotional bias and positivity bias observed with the NimStim faces
helps generalize from previous research through the use of a novel stimulus set. Future
research may want to include better controlled face stimuli, such as schematic faces.
The stimuli used in the current design were also not balanced for luminance and
contrast, nor were the color overlays, which could bias results. However, our neutralneutral comparisons from Study 2 support the concept that the color overlays were not
strong enough to drive effects. The stimuli used were also all Caucasian males, which
could limit generalizability as emotions are differentially attributed by gender (Plant,
Hyde, Keltner, & Devine, 2000). The samples were also largely female which could bias
results as women are generally better at recognizing facial emotions (Hoffman, Kessler,
Eppel, Rukavina, & Traue, 2010). These potentially biases could be addressed with the
use of different stimuli, or hypotheses about gender differences could be tested by fully
crossing perceiver gender and target gender.
This research can also only address the structure of perception of facial emotion
expression and not induced or felt emotions, although it is possible that they follow the
same structure. Future research will need to examine whether induced emotional
experiences show similar patterns of conflict and/or integration. Utilizing a similar design
but with non-face stimuli, such as IAPS images (e.g., Alpers & Pauli, 2006), could help
expand the scope of the current work.
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Another potential limitation of this work is the mixed results from Study 2, which
only partially support previously replicated emotional bias effects (Alpers & Gerdes,
2007; Bannerman et al., 2008). That is, no emotional bias effect was observed for the
disgust-neutral and sad-neutral pairings in Study 2. These results suggest that changing
the response options, even while holding the stimuli constant, can drastically impact the
nature of the task. While unexpected and hard to integrate with the other study results,
this effect, combined with the results of Study 3, may build evidence against conclusions
from prior research arguing that BR paradigms are more influenced by bottom-up than
top-down influences (Meng & Tong, 2004; Dieter & Tadin, 2011).
Finally, in Study 3 two variables were manipulated simultaneously. Namely, both
explicit focus instructions were given as well as different response options. Ideally, these
two effects could be manipulated separately to examine the role of merely changing
response options versus also explicitly changing evaluative goal. However, as top-down
effects are generally weak in BR paradigms (Meng & Tong, 2004), the inclusion of two
relatively subtle changes seemed appropriate. It is possible also that the effects observed
in Study 3 reflect a demand effect, rather than changes in actual perception. That is,
participants may have shifted their response threshold based off instructions rather than
changes in perception. However, if this were the case, a symmetrical effect might be
expected as the demands were the same for the positive and negative focus conditions.
Future directions
Follow-up research on these phenomena could come in several forms. The
inclusion of neuroimaging methodology (i.e., fMRI) with this paradigm could help
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investigate the neural mechanisms of emotional conflict and neural regions more
associated with perceptual switching between emotions. For instance, certain neural
regions such as the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex may show greater activation when
resolving high vs. low conflict emotional stimuli (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004).
Additionally, regions which demonstrate some specificity in response to certain emotions
(e.g., the anterior insula with disgust; Calder et al., 2000; Phillips et al., 1998) may show
perceptual switching despite retinal stimulation remaining constant throughout the task.
Emotion localization is controversial and alternative models propose more general
emotional processing regions (see Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett,
2012) or whole-brain patterns which better reflection emotional experiences (Chang, et
al., 2015). These measures would add another level of discrimination in organizing
emotional space.
Future research could also examine emotional space using non-face stimuli in
emotion-emotion pairs to better understand emotional space (Alpers & Pauli, 2006). For
instance, do disgust and fear inducing scenes show similar dynamics to disgust and fear
faces in a BR paradigm? Such research would extend these implications from facial
perception only to a more general emotion model.
Conclusion
Using dynamic measurements can more fully characterize conflict, which can
help test theories of perceptual distance offered by different models of emotion.
Binocular rivalry is an ideal paradigm for examining such conflict. Conflict, in the
current paradigms, reflects perceptual closeness, or the ability of two competing stimuli
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to be integrated. Although results failed to conclusively support either of the proposed
continuous models of emotion (i.e., circumplex and FEE), the positivity and fear biases
observed offer support for a hierarchy of emotional processing which may be supported
by a neural hierarchy. For instance, these results support the concept that positive stimuli
are preferentially processed compared to negative stimuli. These results can be
interpreted in terms of a discrete emotion model which prioritizes happy and fearful
stimuli compared to disgust, sad and neutral stimuli. Importantly these biases can be
modulated by top-down influences, such that attended to attributes receive additional
processing. This effect was observed for positive, the dominant signal, but not negative,
the weaker signal, stimuli. Overall, these results suggest that BR is an appropriate
mechanism for probing the nature of emotion and future research should expand upon
this work with other emotional stimuli.
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Appendix A: Tables
Table 1. Emotion-Emotion Pairs 3x2 Design

High Conflict
Medium Conflict
Low Conflict

Cross-valence
Happy-Sad
Happy-Fear
Happy-Disgust

Within-valence
Fear-Disgust
Disgust-Sad
Fear-Sad

Emotion-emotion pairs arranged by valence and conflict level according to the FEE model.
Cross-valence pairs include happy with a negative emotion and within-valence pairs include
two negative emotions. High conflict pairs are more perceptually dissimilar than low conflict
pairs.

65

Table 2. Study 1 Within-Condition Effects
Means (SD)
Condition
Disgust-Neutral
Fear-Neutral
Happy-Neutral
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Sad-Neutral
Neutral-Neutral

Measure

t statistic

p statistic

Cohen’s d

Predominance (%)

t(42)=10.95

<.001

1.67

Emotion

Neutral

Mixed

61.92 (18.89)

18.80 (15.63)

19.28 (22.70)

Dominance (s)

t(42)=6.86

<.001

1.05

11.83 (3.74)

5.58 (3.87)

4.31 (3.78)

Predominance (%)

t(42)=16.27

<.001

2.48

68.85 (17.50)

12.79 (11.73)

18.36 (17.95)

Dominance (s)

t(42)=11.56

<.001

1.96

14.15 (3.91)

3.19 (2.58)

4.65 (3.85)

Predominance (%)

t(42)=12.97

<.001

1.98

74.29 (21.56)

12.00 (14.51)

13.70 (14.38)

Dominance (s)

t(42)=15.23

<.001

2.34

15.93 (4.23)

3.07 (2.53)

3.23 (3.35)

Predominance (%)

t(42)=4.39

<.001

0.67

49.58 (19.88)

25.71 (18.79)

24.71 (22.74)

Dominance (s)

t(42)=3.43

.001

0.51

10.25 (4.35)

5.97 (4.32)

5.38 (4.83)

Predominance (%)

t(42)=-14.33

<.001

2.19

9.59 (13.59)

76.74 (24.93)

13.66 (21.27)

Dominance (s)

t(42)=-13.95

<.001

2.12

1.88 (3.01)

17.22 (5.29)

2.79 (4.29)

Table 2 shows means for dominance in seconds and predominance as percent of total trials. T-test statistics for all emotionneutral conditions in Study 1 are reported as tested against 0. Overall effects were observed for all conditions for both
dominance and predominance. Positive t-statistics reflect emotion being the more commonly reported percept.

Table 3: Study 1 Results Between-Condition Effects
Means (SD)
p
statistic

Partial Eta
Squared

Disgust-Neutral

Measure

F statistic

Fear-Neutral

Happy-Neutral

Sad-Neutral

Predominance Ratio

F(3, 126)=13.44

<.001

0.24

.58 (.35)abc

.70 (.28)ad

.71 (.36)be

.32 (.48)cde

Dominance Ratio
Mixed Predominance
(%)

F(3, 126)=18.22

<.001

0.30

.40 (.38)ab

.59 (.30)ac

.65 (.28)bd

.24 (.47)cd

F(3, 126)=4.73

<.005

0.11

19.28 (22.69)a

18.35 (17.94)bc

13.70 (14.38)abd

24.71 (22.74)cd

Mixed Dominance (s)

F(3, 126)=5.52

<.005

0.12

4.31 (3.78)a

4.66 (3.85)b

3.18 (3.33)abc

5.38 (4.83)c

Response Latency (s)

F(3, 126)=4.02

<.01

0.09

3.36 (2.24)a

3.09 (1.56)b

2.87 (1.55)ac

3.49 (1.84)bc

Oscillations

F(3, 126)=9.52

<.001

0.19

3.28 (2.58)abc

2.22 (1.55)ad

2.49 (1.95)b

2.60 (2.33)cd

67

Results for the between-condition RMGLM's are reported here. Higher predominance and dominance scores reflect greater
emotional bias. Significant (p<.05) pairwise comparisons are marked row-wise with the same superscript.

Table 4: Study 2 Results Dominance and Predominance
Means (SD)
Condition
Disgust-Neutral
Fear-Neutral
Happy-Neutral
Sad-Neutral
Disgust-Happy
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Fear-Happy
Happy-Sad
Fear-Sad
Disgust-Sad
Disgust-Fear

Red-Green

Measure
Predominance (%)

t statistic
t(38)=-0.23

p statistic

Cohen’s d

Emotion1

Emotion2

Mixed

>.05

.04

37.62 (21.22)

36.98 (20.49)

25.40 (25.89)

Dominance (s)

t(38)=-1.15

>.05

.18

6.48 (2.99)

6.56 (2.28)

4.06 (3.50)

Predominance (%)

t(38)=5.28

<.001

.85

50.65 (18.21)

27.10 (14.68)

22.23 (19.92)

Dominance (s)

t(38)=4.32

<.001

.69

7.86 (2.61)

5.09 (1.92)

4.08 (2.46)

Predominance (%)

t(38)=7.71

<.001

1.23

58.65 (19.90)

22.12 (17.32)

19.23 (20.65)

Dominance (s)

t(38)=8.14

<.001

1.30

9.88 (3.29)

3.85 (2.45)

3.67 (2.82)

Predominance (%)

t(38)=1.53

>.05

.24

41.16 (21.75)

34.08 (22.72)

24.76 (23.53)

Dominance (s)

t(38)=0.80

>.05

.13

6.92 (3.03)

6.10 (3.19)

3.89 (3.16)

Predominance (%)

t(38)=-3.21

<.005

.51

29.49 (18.25)

44.55 (19.41)

25.96 (21.91)

Dominance (s)

t(38)=-5.95

<.001

.95

4.89 (2.38)

8.37 (2.53)

3.98 (3.16)

Predominance (%)

t(38)=-0.70

>.05

.11

31.73(18.55)

35.90 (20.52)

32.37 (23.94)

Dominance (s)

t(38)=-1.87

>.05

.30

5.18 (2.42)

6.43 (2.93)

5.58 (3.56)

>.05

.31

39.42 (19.35)

28.53 (17.19)

32.05 (21.42)

<.001

.81

7.65 (2.46)

4.81 (2.46)

4.80 (3.02)

<.001

1.03

52.56 (21.68)

19.55 (16.92)

27.88 (21.55)

<.001

.72

7.88 (2.95)

4.50 (2.43)

4.55 (2.96)

>.05

.08

35.05 (15.97)

39.55 (19.92)

25.40 (15.54)

Predominance (%)
Dominance (s)
Predominance (%)
Dominance (s)
Predominance (%)

t(38)=1.94
t(38)=5.07
t(38)=6.44
t(38)=4.51
t(38)=-0.51

Dominance (s)

t(38)=-1.39

>.05

.22

5.94 (2.00)

6.72 (2.57)

4.24 (2.47)

Predominance (%)

t(38)=-2.57

<.05

.41

30.97 (20.76)

44.52 (21.90)

24.52 (23.94)

Dominance (s)

t(38)=-4.02

<.001

.64

4.81 (2.25)

7.83 (2.99)

4.08 (2.86)

Predominance (%)

t(38)=-1.83

.29

33.97 (25.83)

23.72 (22.36)

42.31 (29.47)

Dominance (s)

t(38)=-1.15

>.05
>.05

5.79 (3.27)

4.86 (3.03)

6.94 (3.98)

.18

Table 4 shows means for dominance in seconds and predominance as percent of total trials. T-test statistics for all conditions in
Study 2 are reported as tested against 0. Positive t-statistics reflect Emotion 1 being the more commonly reported percept. Low,
medium and high conflict pairs are highlighted in light grey, grey and dark grey respectively.
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Table 5: Study 2 Results Between Emotion-Neutral Condition Effects
Means (SD)
Measure

F statistic

p statistic

Partial Eta
Squared

Disgust-Neutral
ab

Fear-Neutral

Happy-Neutral

.12 (.50)de

F(3, 114)=11.76

<.001

0.24

-.02 (.44)

Dominance Ratio

F(3, 114)=16.66

<.001

0.31

-.06 (.30)ab

.19 (.27)ac

.43 (.33)bcd

.05 (.37)d

Mixed Predominance (%)

F(3, 114)=1.07

>.05

.03

25.32 (25.89)

22.22 (19.92)

19.23 (20.65)

24.73 (23.54)

Mixed Dominance (s)

F(3, 114)=.25

>.05

.01

4.05 (3.50)

4.07 (2.46)

3.67 (2.82)

3.88 (3.16)

Response Latency (s)

F(3, 114)=2.03

>.05

.05

3.00 (1.60)

3.07 (1.98)

2.70 (1.51)

3.18 (1.53)

a

c

Oscillations

F(3, 114)=6.00

<.005

.14

3.95 (2.99)

3.04 (2.36)

.48 (.39)

Sad-Neutral

bce

Predominance Ratio

ab

.31 (.37)

acd

3.26 (2.17)

2.58 (1.82)bc
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Results for the emotion-neutral pairs between-condition RMGLM's. Higher predominance and dominance scores reflect a stronger
emotional bias. Significant (p<.05) pairwise comparisons are marked row-wise with the same superscript.

Table 6: Study 2 Emotion-Emotion Condition Effects Means and SDs
Means (SD)
Cross

Valence

Within
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Conflict

Low

Medium

High

Low

Medium

High

Measure

Happy-Disgust

Happy-Fear

Happy-Sad

Fear-Sad

Sad-Disgust

Fear-Disgust

Predominance Ratio

.20 (.40)c

.05 (.47)b

.16 (.51)a

.45 (.43)abcde

.03 (.41)e

.20 (.50)d

Dominance Ratio

.26 (.27)ce

.10 (.33)acd

.25 (.31)ab

.26 (.36)dg

.06 (.27)befg

.23 (.36)f

Mixed Predominance (%)

25.96 (21.91)

32.37 (23.94)cd

32.05 (21.42)ab

27.89 (21.55)

25.36 (15.54)bd

24.47 (23.94)ac

Mixed Dominance (s)

3.98 (3.16)abe

5.58 (3.56)bcd

4.80 (3.02)a

4.55 (2.96)

4.24 (2.47)d

4.06 (2.86)ce

Response Latency (s)

2.85 (1.89)c

2.90 (1.55)b

2.84 (1.62)a

3.17 (1.55)

3.19 (1.57)

3.40 (1.82)abc

Oscillations

3.76 (2.46)c

3.83 (2.53)b

3.53 (2.62)a

2.68 (1.85)abcde

3.61 (2.52)e

3.43 (2.68)d

Results for the emotion-emotion pairs between-condition RMGLM's are reported here. Cross-valence pairs included pairs with happy
and a negative emotion. Within-valence pairs were also two negative emotions. Low, medium and high conflict are defined by the
FEE model. Significant (p<.05) pairwise comparisons are marked row-wise with the same superscript. Low, medium and high
conflict pairs are highlighted in light grey, grey and dark grey respectively.

Table 7: Study 3 Happy Predominance Means and SDs
Means (SD)
Negative Focus

No Focus

Positive Focus

Happy-Disgust

0.20 (.42)

0.09 (.41)

0.29 (.44)

Happy-Fear

-0.04 (.45)

0.15 (.40)

0.30 (.44)

Happy-Sad

0.17 (.60)

0.28 (.38)

0.39 (.38)

Trial Type

Predominance means for each evaluative condition and trial type Higher scores reflect a
stronger happy bias. All trial types are cross-valence. Low, medium and high conflict
pairs are in light grey, grey, and dark grey respectively.
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Table 8: Study 3 Happy Dominance Means and SDs
Means (SD)
Negative Focus

No Focus

Positive Focus

Happy-Disgust

0.13 (.33)

0.15 (.17)

0.19 (.38)

Happy-Fear

0.00 (.35)

0.12 (.23)

0.23 (.33)

Happy-Sad

0.23 (.32)

0.25 (.31)

0.35 (.30)

Trial Type

Dominance means for each evaluative condition and trial type. Higher scores reflect a
stronger happy bias. All trial types are cross-valence. Low, medium and high conflict
pairs are in light grey, grey, and dark grey respectively.
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Table 9: Study 3 Mixed Predominance Means and SDs
Means (SD)
Negative Focus

No Focus

Positive Focus

Happy-Disgust

24.55 (21.10)

22.32 (25.08)

25.45 (25.11)

Happy-Fear

32.59 (24.38)

28.13 (22.47)

30.80 (29.95)

Happy-Sad

28.13 (25.60)

25.00 (23.32)

26.34 (26.21)

Trial Type

Mixed predominance means for each evaluative condition and trial type. Higher scores
reflect more mixed initial percepts. All trial types are cross-valence. Low, medium and high
conflict pairs are in light grey, grey, and dark grey respectively.

74

Appendix B: Figures

Figure 1. Example Trial

Figure 1. This figure shows an example trial from the binocular rivalry task. The task was
displayed via a stereoscope with a black divider to ensure that only one image was shown to each
eye. The left image shows a green, neutral face, while the right portrays a red, happy expression.
Color overlays were randomized across trials, but within each trial one image was always red and
the other green.

75

Figure 2: Study 2 Emotion-Emotion Predominance and Dominance

Figure 2. A) Predominance ratios for emotion-emotion pairs broken down by cross- or withinvalence and conflict level. Predominance was calculated as (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1 −
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2 )/ (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1 + 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2 ). As different
anchors were used in the emotion-emotion pairs, the absolute value of each predominance ratio
was taken to facilitate comparison. The medium conflict pairs (happy-fear and disgust-sad)
displayed the least predominance, followed by the high conflict pairs (happy-sad and feardisgust), and the largest predominance ratios were observed in the low conflict pairs (happydisgust, fear-sad). B) Dominance ratios for emotion-emotion pairs broken down by cross- or
within-valence and conflict level. Dominance was calculated as (𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1 −
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2 )/ (𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1 + 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2 ). As different anchors
were used in the emotion-emotion pairs, the absolute value of each dominance ratio was taken to
facilitate comparison. There was a main effect of conflict driven by the medium conflict pairs
(happy-fear, disgust sad) have lower dominance ratios than either the high conflict pairs (happysad, fear-disgust) or low conflict pairs (happy-disgust, fear-sad).
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Figure 3: Study 2 Emotion-Emotion Mixed Duration
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Figure 3. Mixed dominance, in seconds, for emotion-emotion pairs broken down by cross- or
within-valence and conflict level. There was an interaction of conflict and valence type driven by
the medium conflict, cross-valence pair (happy-fear) having greater mixed dominance than either
the low conflict cross-valence pair (happy-disgust) or the high conflict, cross valence pair (happysad). There were no differences between the three within-valence pairs (low conflict: fear-sad,
medium conflict: disgust-sad, high conflict: fear-disgust).
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Figure 4: Study 2 Emotion-Emotion Response Latency
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Figure 4. Response latency, in seconds, for emotion-emotion pairs broken down by cross- or
within-valence and conflict level. Response latency was shorter for cross-valence (happy-sad,
happy-fear, happy-disgust) than within-valence pairs (fear-disgust, disgust-sad, fear-sad).
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Number of Changes

Figure 5: Study 2 Emotion-Emotion Oscillations
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Figure 5. Oscillations, or the number of changes per trial, for emotion-emotion pairs broken
down by cross- or within-valence and conflict level. For within-valence pairs, there were fewer
oscillations in the low conflict, fear-sad condition, than the medium conflict, disgust-sad, and
high conflict, fear-disgust pairs. Oscillations did not vary as a function of conflict for the crossvalence pairs.
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Figure 6: Study 3 Happy Predominance and Dominance

Figure 6. A) Happy predominance ratios for cross-valence pairs broken down by evaluative
condition (negative focus, no focus, or positive focus) and conflict level (low, medium, high).
Predominance was calculated as (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2 )/
(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦 + 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2 ). There was a main effect of evaluative focus
driven by more happy predominance in the positive focus compared to the no focus and negative
focus conditions. There was also an effect of conflict such that the high conflict, happy-sad pair
displayed the greatest happy predominance. B) Happy dominance ratios for cross-valence pairs
broken down by evaluative condition (negative focus, no focus, or positive focus) and conflict
level (low, medium, high). Dominance was calculated as (𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦 −
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2 )/(𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦 + 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2 ). There was a main effect of
evaluative focus driven by more happy dominance in the positive focus compared to the no focus
and negative focus conditions. There was also an effect of conflict such that the high conflict,
happy-sad pair displayed the greatest happy dominance.
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